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Introduction 
One of the major barriers to the successful implementation of the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) principle is the lack of a political will to intervene (Keating 2012). While 
a considerable body of academic research has argued that public opinion is incredibly 
important for implementing an R2P policy (Bellamy 2012; Jentleson 2009), we have very 
little understanding of that factors that might influence general attitudes about 
humanitarian intervention. Political will is not only crucially important for responding to 
mass atrocities2 but also to deter those atrocities from taking place in the first place. The 
ability of militarily capable states to credibly signal a willingness to intervene to stop mass 
atrocities is potentially a powerful mechanism to prevent mass atrocities. We investigate 
the relationship between public support for humanitarian intervention, credible signalling 
of political will and the potential to deter states from engaging in genocide. 
The paper will be broken up into six sections. Section one discusses the previous 
literature on the importance of political will for the R2P agenda, specifically focussing on 
issues of representativeness. The second section extends this debate by integrating 
research into coercive diplomacy into R2P debates specifically highlighting the 
importance of domestic public opinion in maximising the credibility of threats to 
intervene. Having highlighted the importance of public opinion for R2P we then move 
onto the third section examining the underpinnings of support for humanitarian 
intervention, specifically examining the role of learning from previous conflicts and 
psychological predispositions that will influence public attitudes about the effectiveness 
and moral justification of using military force to protect civilians abroad. Section Four 
discusses research design, outlining both the dataset and the method used to investigate 
the underpinnings of public support for humanitarian intervention. Fifth, we discuss the 
                                                        
2 We use mass atrocities to cover the 4 crimes that the R2P agenda focusses on: genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In our dataset we are specifically examining a willingness to 
intervene to stop human rights abuses broadly conceived. 
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results, focussing on the variables that influence public perceptions on the moral 
justification for intervention, the effectiveness of intervention and how they influence 
support for specific interventions.  The sixth and final section considers the implications 
of the findings, highlighting areas that undermine public support and can adversely affect 
the political will for intervention. 
 
1. Political Will 
The lack of political will amongst decision-makers can be seen as one of the biggest 
impediments to successfully executing an R2P policy.  One of the key factors 
undermining political will is resources, as military interventions are costly in both blood 
and treasure. When the costs are large and the national benefits are intangible we expect 
the elite would be less willing to intervene. Domestic and international contexts also 
impact on willingness to intervene; specifically Bellamy (2005) noted that the Iraq 
invasion reduced the willingness of elites to engage in foreign adventures, and has since 
noted that the 2011 intervention in Libya should be viewed as the exception rather than 
the norm (201, 1-3). In other words, even if we now live in an era in which the primary 
question is how, rather than whether to act, political will remains a key component. An elite 
willingness to stop mass atrocities will be underpinned by public support for an R2P 
agenda. Public approval for intervention will be affected by a concern to do something 
about the mass atrocity and by a belief that an intervention will make a difference (Evans 
2008, 224).The clearest exposition of the importance of public opinion comes from 
Macfarlane et. al (2004) who argue that Òpublic opinion is crucial in generating the 
requisite national and international political will for humanitarian interventionsÓ (p. 988).  
Without mass support for humanitarian intervention it will be difficult for decision-
makers to intervene in the first place and sustain support for that intervention over the 
longer period. 
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Pattison (2007) discusses the link between representativeness and the legitimacy 
of humanitarian interventions. He argues that in order to be considered legitimate  a 
humanitarian intervention needs to be both internally and externally representative. To be 
internally representative the state preparing to intervene needs to reflect the opinions of 
its citizens. To be externally representative the intervention needs to reflect the opinions 
of the political community that is going to be protected (Pattison 2007). To be 
considered legitimate an intervention needs to represent both the views of the citizens of 
the intervening state and the views of the political community subject to that 
intervention. This paper addresses issues related to internal representativeness. It is 
worth noting in passing, however, that research examining external representativeness of 
humanitarian interventions is non-existent, representing an enormous gap in the R2P 
literature. 
While recognising there are strong moral reasons for humanitarian interventions 
to be represent the populationÕs wishes, the major theoretical discussion of this piece 
relates to the role of public opinion in maximising the effectiveness of humanitarian 
intervention and the capacity to coerce human rights abusers in the international system. 
 
2. Public Opinion, Coercive Diplomacy and R2P 
Political will is affected by a variety of factors of which public opinion is one crucial 
dimension. Public opinion in democratic states is one of the most transparent 
characteristics behind elite calculations affecting their willingness to intervene and pay 
the costs of foreign military adventures. Manifest public support for intervention signals 
to human-rights abusers that a powerful liberal democracy has a domestic incentive to 
intervene (Davies 2012). Conversely, a state whose citizens who are plainly predisposed 
against intervention will struggle to convince adversaries of its military resolve.  Blending 
the coercive diplomacy literature with discussions relating to the effectiveness of R2P, it 
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becomes clear why public attitudes towards humanitarian intervention are a potentially 
crucial consideration.  
Coercive diplomacy is defined as negotiations backed up with a threat of force 
(George 1991). A coercive diplomatic strategy is an alluring alternative to war, as it 
provides many of the benefits without the costs and risks associated with military 
conflict. The two dimensions to a successful coercive diplomatic strategy are firstly, a 
state has to have the capability to inflict unacceptable costs on a target and secondly the 
threat of unacceptable costs has to be credible (Davies 2012).  Credibility can often be 
garnered from interests, if the state clearly has strong interests in the region for geo-
strategic reasons then the threats are credible because they have either economic or 
security imperatives that need to be fulfilled. However, in cases of R2P, intervention is 
based around a normative agenda rather than strategic calculations, which in turn makes 
estimates of credibility less clear-cut. So while the United States and United Kingdom 
might have the capability to prevent an atrocity and punish those who had conducted it, 
their willingness to do so will very much be called into question. In the absence of geo-
strategic interests in the region, it is difficult for western policy-makers credibly to signal 
a willingness to intervene and punish those perpetrators of mass atrocities. There will 
always be a risk that the target believes the threat of intervention is a bluff.  
A solution to the credibility problem can be derived in three ways.  The first is 
through reputation.  Establishing a reputation for carrying through commitments to 
intervene will make future threats credible (Sartori 2002; Guisinger and Smith 2002). The 
second is through audience costs. This powerful way of demonstrating commitment is 
generated by a national leader making a high-profile speech that is heard by both the 
leaderÕs electorate and the international adversary (Fearon 1994). In that speech the 
leader stakes his reputation on following through with the threat, thereby inflicting 
potential domestic political costs on himself if he fails subsequently to do so. While there 
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is dispute about the extent to which publics react badly to inconsistency and perceived 
weakness as opposed simply to unpopular interventions (Levendusky and Horowitz 
2012), there is ample experimental evidence that unfulfilled threats have a cost in public 
approval (Tomz 2007; Davies and Johns 2013), and thus that audience costs can generate 
credibility.  
The third solution to the credibility problem is through a permissive domestic 
political environment in which the public actively support humanitarian interventions, 
punishing elites for not protecting humanity. Since the climate of public opinion in 
democracies is so transparent, it sends a signal to the perpetrators of mass atrocities 
about the likelihood that a western liberal democracy is bluffing rather than 
contemplating intervention. Applying insights from the literature on Strategic Conflict 
Avoidance (SCA) we see that rival states become more cooperative towards the United 
States if they perceive that an unpopular US President has a domestic incentive to initiate 
an international dispute to divert attention from domestic problems (Fordham 2005). It 
is highly likely that states considering perpetrating a mass atrocity will examine the 
international environment when deciding on a course of action. While there may be 
significant perceived benefits associated with widespread repression (as in the case of 
Syria), the perceived costs may be even greater if western democracies are expected to 
intervene and maybe even overthrow the regime. This reinforces the idea that 
perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes are not Ôpassive bystandersÕ but, in sharp contrast, 
interact with the changing international political environment (Bellamy, 2012). 
Moving from the general climate of opinion to consider attitudes towards 
specific military interventions, the role of public opinion is even clearer.  If published 
polls indicate widespread support for intervention then the targets know that there is at 
least no electoral barrier to intervene and maybe a strong domestic political incentive to 
stop the atrocities. Regime transparency and a supportive domestic political environment 
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for intervention can thus together provide a powerful tool for coercive diplomacy, 
especially in situations where threat credibility is very much in doubt, as is generally the 
case for an ethical rather than interests based foreign policy. Of course, the downside of 
the transparency argument is that, when public opinion is against intervention, threat 
credibility is much harder to achieve because potential targets of military strikes are well 
aware of the strong domestic forces ranged against an intervention.  
Our case is therefore that public opinion within the potential intervener is 
potentially very important, not only for reasons of representativeness and legitimacy but 
also the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy in preventing or halting mass atrocities and 
sustaining an intervention when it takes place. The question then turns to those factors 
that might influence public opinion in this context.  In the next section, we outline what 
research elsewhere suggests about the factors likely to shape public attitudes towards 
humanitarian interventions. 
 
3. Attitudes towards Humanitarian Intervention: Morality and Effectiveness. 
Herrmann et al. (1999) demonstrate that citizensÕ support for a given military 
engagement is based on a combination of their predispositions towards military action 
with information about the specific context. While recognising that any individual 
humanitarian crisis will have its own contextual features that shape public support for 
getting involved, we focus here on those more general predispositions towards 
humanitarian intervention.  Support for an R2P policy is likely to be driven by two 
attitudes or predispositions in particular: i) is there a moral justification for such 
intervention? and ii) is such intervention generally effective? 
The critical importance of moral justification for non-interests based 
interventions is obvious. If a citizen believes that there is no ethical basis for interfering 
in another stateÕs affairs, then she is unlikely to support a specific foreign involvement in 
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cases like Syria or the Central African Republic. Perhaps slightly less obvious but also 
very important is a perception that humanitarian intervention will be effective Ð that is, 
succeed in its core goals (and without major negative side-effects).  Jentleson (1992) used 
the phrase Ôpretty prudentÕ to characterise a US public whose decisions on military action 
were driven more by a kind of cost-benefit analysis than by ethical commitments either 
to pacifism or interventionism.  Likely success has been shown in numerous other 
studies to be a key predictor of support for war (Eichenberg 2005) and casualty tolerance 
(Gelpi et al. 2005-6). Our first main research question, then, concerns the extent to 
which the British public assesses humanitarian intervention as generally i) an ethical and 
ii) an effective policy. 
Of course, that raises a second question: what generates these assessments? Why 
is support at the level that it is, and why do different citizens sometimes come to 
differing conclusions about whether humanitarian action is justifiable and likely to 
succeed?  In this article, we focus on two sets of factors that drive overall predispositions 
towards such intervention: learning from previous conflicts; and individual differences in 
personality variables.   
Recent experiences of international conflicts will clearly influence public 
perceptions about both the morality and the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions. 
In general the public have little knowledge about international affairs and they rely 
heavily on elite cues and heuristics based around previous involvements in international 
affairs. We noted earlier the likely impact of Iraq and Afghanistan on public reactions to 
future interventions (Bellamy 2008).  That impact was clearly reflected in opinion polls 
showing widespread public hostility to intervention in Syria at the time, in August 2013, 
when the UK Parliament was recalled to vote on possible military action.     
Here, we test systematically for that spill-over effect from recent conflicts.  Since 
there were question marks about both the justifiability and the effectiveness of the Iraq 
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mission in particular, we anticipate that evaluations of recent interventions will shape 
perceptions of both justifiability and success. Those individuals who felt that Afghanistan 
and Iraq interventions were worthwhile will be more predisposed to support future 
interventions than those who felt the interventions went particularly badly. Moving from 
individual differences to the aggregate, we are interested in testing whether Iraq and 
Afghanistan have undermined public perceptions about the morality and effectiveness of 
military interventions.  The relevant hypotheses are:   
H1a: There will be a relationship between perceptions of success in Iraq/Afghanistan and the 
belief that humanitarian intervention can be morally justified. 
H1b: There will be a  relationship between perceptions of success in Iraq/Afghanistan and the 
belief that humanitarian intervention is effective. 
 
However, support for military action is not based purely on a decision-making 
calculus based on factors like recent experience of conflict. Psychological and personality 
variables have also been shown to have a powerful impact on support for war.  Among 
these, the two most prominent are Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO) Ð often referred to as the Òlethal unionÓ because together 
they strongly affect a variety of militant and ethnocentric attitudes including war 
(Altemeyer 1998).  While the two are generally associated with belligerence, things 
become more complicated in the specific case of humanitarian interventions. 
The link between authoritarianism and support for war lies above all in the 
heightened sense of threat felt by those RWA (Winter 1996). It has been argued that 
RWA stems from a harsh and overly-disciplinary childhood which engenders a view of 
the world as a threatening place where social conformity helps the individual reduce that 
threat (Duckitt 2001).  Altemeyer (1988, 1998) found that there was a strong correlation 
between authoritarianism and the perception that the world is a dangerous and 
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threatening place. Similarly, Lavine et al. (1999) found that strong authoritarians are more 
receptive to messages that emphasise threat.  McFarland (2006) in his analysis of support 
for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 finds that RWA tends to increase the perception that 
Iraq is a threat which in turn leads to an increase in support for military action. If threat to 
the self is the key driver behind support for military intervention, then threat to others 
should not be sufficient to justify military action.  Moreover, when it comes to 
effectiveness, humanitarian intervention may even prove counter-productive because it 
increases the risks not only to British soldiers but potentially also national security. Only 
under conditions where national security is under threat would we anticipate that RWAs 
would regard intervention as necessary; in other situations, reducing threat to the state 
and the individual would be best achieved by avoiding interventions. We therefore 
hypothesise. 
H2a: There will be  relationship between RWA and the belief that humanitarian intervention can be 
morally justified. 
H2b: There will be a  relationship between RWA and the belief that humanitarian 
intervention is effective. 
 
While authoritarianism increases militarism through increased threat perception, 
Social Dominance is expected to increase support for war through a perception of 
superiority and lack of empathy about the human costs of military action (Duckitt 2001; 
Pratto et al. 1994).  Pratto et. al (1994) defines social dominance orientation as Òthe 
extent that one desires that oneÕs in-group dominate and be superior to out-groupsÓ 
(p.742). Individuals with a high Social Dominance Orientation are concerned with 
hierarchy within societies and group dominance (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). They are 
power maximisers, tending to see the world as a Òcompetitive jungleÓ (Duckitt et al., 
2002), and as such tend to emphasise national dominance and to support wars that 
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favour the national interest (Pratto et. al 1994).  SDOs are also unsentimental, the trait 
being strongly negatively correlated with empathy.   
This leads to conflicting expectations about the justifiability of humanitarian 
intervention in the eyes of high SDOs.  On the one hand, SDOs are not much inclined 
to question the justifiability of in-group actions, and might regard military action as a 
generally acceptable means of emphasising national dominance and superiority over out-
groups. On the other hand, the humanitarian suffering that typically drives support for 
intervention will instead be regarded as an inevitable feature of that Ôcompetitive jungleÕ 
(McFarland 2005) and so SDOs may see little normative justification for action.  Since it 
is hard to say which of those drivers will outweigh the other, we stick with a null 
hypothesis in the case of justifiability.  With effectiveness, things seem more clear-cut: 
SDO should be negatively associated with the belief that intervention will be able to 
eliminate humanitarian abuse. 
H3a: There will be  relationship between SDO and the belief that humanitarian intervention can be 
morally justified. 
H3b: There will be a  relationship between SDO and the belief that humanitarian intervention 
is effective. 
 
4. Research Design and Data 
Data 
In this section, we discuss the data and survey measures used to address those 
hypotheses.  Our data are taken from Waves 1 and 2 of an Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC)-funded three-wave panel survey of the British publicÕs foreign 
policy attitudes.3 The surveys were conducted over the internet by YouGov, using their 
                                                        
3ÔForeign Policy Attitudes and Support for War among the British PublicÕ, Economic and Social Research 
Council (RES-062-23-1952). 
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300,000 members as the sampling frame.4  Fieldwork was in January-February 2010 and 
therefore at a time when military action in Iraq and Afghanistan was ongoing.  While it 
might be thought that this timing will overstate the impact of those conflicts in 
respondentsÕ minds, there is not much reason to suppose that things have changed a 
great deal since.  British troops remain in Afghanistan at the time of writing and, as noted 
above, the conflicts have cast their shadow over debates about action in Libya, Syria and 
Iran.  In short, if these conflicts were prominent in respondentsÕ minds when answering 
our survey questions, this is not an artefact of survey timing but a consequence of their 
continuing prominence in British public discourse on military action.  
 
Variables. 
Dependent Variables: 
Humanitarian Intervention Justified: Respondents were then asked: ÔIn the world 
today there are various situations in which Britain might use force. Using a scale from 1 
(not at all justified) to 7 (very justified), please say how justified you think the use of 
force would be in each of these situations: Preventing human rights abuses overseasÕ. 
Humanitarian Intervention Effective: Respondents were then asked: ÔIn the world 
today there are various situations in which Britain might use force. Using a scale from 1 
(not at all effective) to 7 (very effective), please say how effective you think the use of 
force would be in each of these situations: Preventing human rights abuses overseasÕ. 
 
Independent Variables: 
                                                        
4 There are good reasons to be confident in the representativeness of the sample as YouGov has an 
impressive track record of data collection and weighting to achieve samples politically reflective of the 
British public. Most of the respondents are recruited (by targeted campaigns on non-political websites) 
rather than volunteering for the panel. Respondents are unable to select the surveys that they take part in, 
they are either sampled or not. 
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Success Afghanistan: How would you BritainÕs recent military actions in Afghanistan? 
Please use a scale from 0 to 6 where 0 means a complete failure and 6 means complete 
success.  
Success Iraq: How would you BritainÕs recent military actions in Afghanistan? Please 
use a scale from 0 to 6 where 0 means a complete failure and 6 means complete success.  
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA): The RWA measure is based on four questions 
(reverse-scored items are asterisked). 
¥ People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences  
¥ People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives*  
¥ Young people today donÕt have enough respect for traditional British values. 
¥ People  should be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the 
government* 
The RWA items were taken from Evans, Heath and LalljeeÕs libertarian- authoritarian 
scale and have been extensively validated using British mass samples. 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO): The SDO measure is based on four questions 
(reverse-scored items are asterisked). 
¥ We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally* 
¥ Some people are just more deserving than others 
¥ It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others 
¥ No one group should dominate in society 
 
Control variables5 
Gender: Is a binary variable where 0 male and 1 female.  
Age: A series of disaggregated dummy variables are included for the categories 25Ð34, 
                                                        
5 While models of public opinion also typically contain socioeconomic controls such as class or income, 
these are not strongly related Ð conceptually or empirically (e.g. Clements 2013) Ð with foreign policy 
attitudes.  
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35Ð44, 45Ð54, 55Ð64 and 65!. The 18Ð25 category is excluded to provide a baseline 
comparison.  
Education: Respondents were asked: ÔAt what age did you leave full-time education?Õ 
The responses were on a five-point Likert scale.  
Party Identification: We control for party identification using dummy variables for the 
main political parties. We include party identification variables for Conservative, Labour, 
Liberal Democrat, Green, United Kingdom Independence Party and the Nationalist 
Parties of Scotland and Wales. The baseline group are non-identifiers.6 
 
5. Results 
Looking at Figure 1, we see a clear difference between attitudes about justification and 
effectiveness.  The public perceive that humanitarian interventions are morally justifiable 
but they question its effectiveness. This is crucially important if elites are trying to 
generate public support for an intervention. If the debate focuses on effectiveness of 
interventions then the government is unlikely to get much traction, but if the elite discuss 
the moral necessity underpinning the need to intervene they may find a more receptive 
audience. 
                                                        
6 It might be argued that we are over-controlling here, since party identification is likely to be at least partly 
causally posterior to personality factors like SDO and authoritarianism.  That makes this a conservative test 
of the effects of those variables. 
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Figure 1 suggests a general scepticism about the effectiveness of humanitarian 
interventions.  Next, we compare with other types of military action by calculating mean 
scores on the 1-7 justifiability and effectiveness scales.  Table 1 shows that, in terms of 
moral justifiability, we see that humanitarian interventions come fourth out of eight, 
although surprisingly behind preventative military action against states developing WMD.  
However, in terms of effectiveness it comes sixth, with a large difference in those 
respondents who believe it to be justifiable and those that think it effective. While it is 
considered relatively justifiable it is also considered an ineffective policy, ahead only of 
democracy promotion and counter-terrorism.  Public doubts about efficacy are equally 
clear if we move from rankings to ratings: the mean effectiveness of humanitarian 
intervention (3.62) is appreciably below the midpoint of the 1-7 scale, while mean 
justifiability is appreciably above that neutral point.  In short, if the British public is 
resistant to a policy of humanitarian intervention, the qualms are more likely to be about 
whether the policy will work than about whether it is ethically sound. Admittedly, 
scepticism about effectiveness is not confined to humanitarian intervention Ð as 
6.1 
7.6 
11.7 
26.2 
22.5 
12.9  13 
11.3 
13.3 
19.1 
27.9 
18.2 
7.4 
2.9 
De/initely 
Cannot 
1  2  3  4  5  De/initely 
Can 
Figure 1 
Justification and Effectiveness of  Humanitarian Interventions 
Justi/ied  Effective 
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confirmed by the overall averages at the bottom of the table.  Still, the justification-
effectiveness gap is a good deal wider in the case of humanitarian interventions than on 
average. 
Table 1 
Mean justifiability and effectiveness (1-7) for different types of military action 
 Justifiability 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
Effectiveness 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
Preventing human rights abuses 4.42 
(1.65) 
3.62 
(1.53) 
Ally defence 4.88 
(1.54) 
4.44 
(1.48) 
Regime change 3.99 
(1.84) 
4.62 
(1.65) 
Resource security 4.19 
(1.75) 
4.19 
(1.43) 
Peace enforcement 4.89 
(1.49) 
4.49 
(1.42) 
WMD prevention 4.59 
(1.75) 
3.72 
(1.64) 
Democracy promotion 3.48 
(1.68) 
3.27 
(1.49) 
Anti-terrorist 
 
 
4.22 
(1.83) 
 
3.56 
(1.63) 
 
 
One obvious explanation for these results is that Iraq and Afghanistan have 
taken their toll on public assessments of the effectiveness of military action.  Model I in 
Table 2 presents the results of an ordered logit model examining the variables that 
influence public perceptions of justification.  Public perceptions of success in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq influence attitudes about the moral justification of humanitarian 
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intervention. Iraq has clearly had the stronger effect of the two previous conflicts 
(B=.479 (p>0.01)) although Afghanistan also contaminates public perceptions about 
justification (B=.279 (p>0.01)). Previous experiences of conflict influence attitudes 
towards intervention, and if previous interventions were considered failures then it will 
make individuals sceptical about the moral justification using military force to protect 
foreign civilians. 
 Looking at psychological variables, we find that authoritarianism has no effect on 
perceptions of moral justification but Social Dominance Orientation does (B=.306 
(p>0.01)).  This is in line with H2a Ð RWAs do not perceive a direct threat in these 
situations and so are not predisposed to justify action Ð but not H3a, because we 
hypothesised that SDOs would be conflicted on this point.  It seems that the national 
dominance element here Ð the SDO-driven perception that the UK has every right to 
intervene in the conduct of another country Ð outweighs any suspicion that humanitarian 
intervention is unjustifiable. Those suspicions, as we see below, seem to be more about 
whether intervention can and will work in a world where human rights abuses are 
inevitable.  In all, attitudes towards normative justification appear thus to be driven not 
by threat perception but rather by a belief that Britain can act in any way it wants on the 
international stage.  
 The control variables also spell out significant factors that influence attitudes 
towards intervention and also suggest that political debate will be more influential on 
attitudes towards moral justification than towards effectiveness. First, we find that 
gender has an important effective on perceptions of justification but in a direction that 
contradicts previous research. Where previous studies have that men are more likely than 
women to support military intervention (Eichenberg 2003, Davies and Johns 2013) this 
study finds the opposite with women being more likely than men to believe that using 
military force to prevent a mass atrocity is morally justifiable (B=.389 (p>0.01)). This 
  18 
gender effect is present even when controlling for psychological processes (RWA and 
SDO) that would be expected to influence support for military action and potentially 
explain gender differences. The results point to a clear interaction between conflict type, 
gender and support for war Ð a finding that needs further investigation elsewhere. Next 
we need to investigate the impact of generational differences on perceptions of 
justification. We find that between the ages of 18-44 there is no discernable age effect, 
attitudes towards the justifiability of humanitarian intervention is broadly similar than the 
baseline group. However, from 45 onwards we observe much greater negativity towards 
the justifiability of humanitarian intervention. The 45-54 category is significantly less 
likely to think a humanitarian intervention is justifiable than the baseline 18-24 group 
(B=-1.50(p>0.01)). The same goes for the 55-64 group (B=-1.09 (p>0.01)) and the 65 
plus bracket (-1.10 (p>0.01)).  The older age groups appear to be far more cynical about 
the use of force and the normative justification for intervention, although as we shall 
discuss shortly these age differences are not found to affect perceptions about the 
effectiveness of military intervention. This age differential could be down to macro-
learning process stemming from an event that the older generations were exposed to, but 
the younger ones were not, although this is clearly speculation. Looking at education, we 
see that the more educated the respondent the less likely they are to believe that 
humanitarian intervention can be morally justified (B=-.108 (p>0.01)). It appears that the 
better educated are more cynical about the ethical case for humanitarian intervention, a 
finding not replicated when examining effectiveness. 
 Next we examine party identification, finding that it is an important factor 
influencing support for military intervention. It appears that political parties may provide 
significant cues about the justifiability of military intervention.  A government trying to 
generate public support for a humanitarian intervention, will look towards their electoral 
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base to assess the domestic political risks and benefits associated with foreign adventures. 
If their supporters are generally behind the use of military intervention it will be less 
politically risky and may even provide electoral benefits, and so the support of party 
identifiers will have a direct domestic impact on a particular governmentÕs will to 
intervene. Model I (justification) demonstrates that party identification does matter, in 
most cases reducing perceptions that humanitarian interventions are morally justifiable.  
In comparison to non-identifiers, Conservatives are less likely to perceive that a 
humanitarian intervention is justifiable (B=-.645 (p>0.01)), which is a slightly stronger 
aversion than Labour identifiers (B=-.593 (p>0.01)). Liberal Democrat identification has 
no impact on perceptions of justifiability and being a Scottish and Welsh nationalist only 
reduces perceptions of justifiability at the 0.10 level.  People who identify with UKIP are 
the least likely to believe that humanitarian interventions are morally justifiable (B=-1.302 
(p>0.01)), followed by Green Party identifiers (B=-1.07 (p>0.01)). If debates 
surrounding the need for intervention focus on the normative case, Liberal Democrat 
leaders will have a more receptive audience amongst their core identifiers than either the 
Conservatives or Labour. If UKIP or the Greens forms part of a government coalition 
government then it will be even more difficult to generate support amongst their core 
support. In general though people who identify with a party tend to be much more 
circumspect about the use of force to protect human rights, even when taking into 
account right wing attitudes and perceptions of previous interventions. The party 
identification result may reflect the level of negative debate about military action amongst 
the political parties. 
Model II suggests there are fewer influences on public perceptions about the 
effectiveness of humanitarian interventions with the key drivers again being perceptions 
of previous conflicts and pre-dispositions. The analysis again demonstrates that those 
respondents who felt that Afghanistan was a success were more likely to think 
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humanitarian interventions were effective (B=.259 (p>0.01)) and this relationship was 
also found for Iraq (B=.297 (p>0.01)). Comparing with model I Iraq has the largest 
effect on both perceptions of justification and effectiveness, but the distinction between 
the two is greatest on justification.  Those who perceive that Iraq was a success were far 
more likely to think humanitarian interventions are justifiable than those who thought 
Afghanistan was a success ceteris paribus. The Iraq war appears to have had the greatest 
effect on what we think is justifiable- Iraq has the strongest affects decisions about 
normative justification for R2P. The effect of previous conflicts on perceptions of 
effectiveness is smaller although still significant. Failed interventions will contaminate 
public attitudes towards future disputes and undermine the case to stop mass atrocities at 
some point in the future.  
Examining the personality variables, we can see that a different set of 
psychological processes drives attitudes towards effectiveness as compared with 
justifiability. Where those higher on SDO are more likely to believe that the UK has a 
right to intervene, they are no more likely than low social dominants to believe that 
intervention will be effective. This null effect, contrary to our prediction in H3b, again 
perhaps reflects the cancelling of two drivers: first, SDOsÕ general belief in the 
effectiveness of military and other power-based solutions; second, their scepticism about 
the capacity of any solution, including military, to eliminate inevitable features of a 
competitive international system.  Meanwhile, in line with H2b, we find a pronounced 
negative relationship between RWA and a belief in the effectiveness of humanitarian 
intervention (B=-.389 (p>0.01)). This, we argue, is because authoritarian personality 
types see such action as exacerbating rather than mitigating risk in a threatening world.  
As such, authoritarians are more prone to a kind of isolationism than are the more 
militant interventionism SDOs. 
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Even when controlling for personality traits, we still find that gender plays an 
important role in explaining perceptions of effectiveness (B=.590 (p>0.01)). The 
difference between the genders is greater in regards to perceptions of effectiveness than 
with perceptions of normative justification, with men being much more likely to perceive 
that humanitarian interventions are effective than women. The genders are a little closer 
in their attitude towards justification, with women being only slightly more inclined to 
believe that humanitarian interventions are morally acceptable, but they are much more 
likely than men to believe that humanitarian interventions will be effective.  
 Now examining age differences, the model indicates that there is no real pattern 
emerge with only the 45-54 age group being less likely to think that humanitarian 
interventions are effective than the baseline 18-24 group (B=-.801 (p>0.01)). We are 
unable to posit a reason for the reluctance of this age group to believe that humanitarian 
interventions are effective, there may have been a formative event that particularly 
affected this groupÕs perception about humanitarian intervention, but again this is 
speculation. We also find Party Identification has little impact on perceptions of 
effectiveness, with only Liberal Democrat identifiers being more likely than non-
identifiers to believe that humanitarian interventions are effective (B=.382 (p>0.01)). If 
debates about a humanitarian intervention are based around effectiveness then party cues 
will be less influential than if the debate was based around justification. Finally, while 
education increases the scepticism about the justification of humanitarian intervention, 
there is no significant difference between the more and less educated. The general 
scepticism about the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention is not mediated through 
education, rather from a larger macro-level learning process. All respondents are 
generally unwilling to believe that humanitarian interventions are effective regardless of 
party identification and age. Overall, the models have demonstrated that there are 
significant differences in how individuals make decisions about the justifiability and 
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efficacy of humanitarian interventions. The models provide some clarity to the factors 
that influence public attitudes towards humanitarian intervention, but they also open up 
some interesting avenues for future research. 
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Table 2 
Results from Multivariate Analysis 
Variables Model I: Justification 
B 
(s.e.) 
Model II: Effectiveness 
B 
(s.e.) 
Afghanistan Success .279 
(.053)*** 
.259 
(.051)*** 
Iraq Success .479 
(.047)*** 
.297 
(.046)*** 
RWA .114 
(.082) 
-.389 
(.083)*** 
SDO .306 
(.08)*** 
.040 
(.081) 
Female .389 
(.095)*** 
.590 
(.095)*** 
25-34 .009 
(.271) 
.395 
(.268) 
35-44 -.479 
(.291) 
-.027 
(.288) 
45-54 -1.50 
(.288)*** 
-.801 
(.284)*** 
55-64 -1.09 
(.278)*** 
-.281 
(.277) 
65+ -1.10 
(.300)*** 
-.234 
(.297) 
Con ID -.645 
(.133)*** 
-.217 
(.132)* 
Lab ID -.593 
(.135)*** 
.017 
(.134) 
LibDem ID -.155 
(.185) 
.382 
(.185)** 
UKIP ID -1.302 
(.308)*** 
-.392 
(.313) 
Green ID -1.07 
(.412)*** 
-.163 
(.401) 
Nationalist ID -.524 
(.286)* 
-.486 
(.317) 
Education -.108 
(.037)*** 
.012 
(.037) 
N 
X2 
Log-Likelihood 
1817 
767.49*** 
-2797.60 
1818 
427.96*** 
-3022.51 
***>0.01 **>0.05 
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6. Implications and Conclusions 
At the beginning of the paper we discussed the importance of public opinion in 
generating the political will to intervene to stop mass atrocities. We also highlighted a 
theoretical mechanism between democratic transparency, public opinion and the capacity 
to deter other states from abusing their own populations. Understanding support for 
humanitarian interventions is therefore vital in the quest to reduce human rights abuses 
and in the development of strategies to maximise public support for foreign intervention. 
This paper has looked at two perceptions that will ultimately affect public willingness to 
intervene: 1) of humanitarian intervention as morally justifiable and 2) of such 
interventions as effective in achieving their objectives.  The processes involved making 
decisions about both of these dimensions are very different.  The fact that attitudes 
towards justification were more easily explained in our regression models suggests that 
judgements about effectiveness are more situational and thus less easily accounted for by 
individualsÕ background characteristics and attitudes.  
 The article shows clearly that experiences with both Iraq and Afghanistan have 
contaminated public perceptions of both the ethics and effectiveness of humanitarian 
interventions. Political parties will lead debates about the merits of humanitarian 
intervention and they have some scope to persuade their supporters.  However, party 
identifiers are not blank slates Ð they have their own predispositions towards such 
military action.  The reluctance of Labour identifiers to see R2P action as justified 
testifies to the limited capacity of Tony BlairÕs liberal interventionism to win over party 
supporters.  PartiesÕ room for persuasive manoeuvre is constrained by fear of alienating 
their base.  And, while the success of military action can to some extent be framed, the 
weakness of party identification effects in Model II suggests a cross-party consensus, 
forged in the shadow of Iraq and Afghanistan, over the limited effectiveness of 
humanitarian intervention. 
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 The models also demonstrate that the psychological underpinnings of support 
for interventions are different depending on whether you are looking at justification or 
effectiveness. SDO, and the belief that the world is governed by the strong, drives a 
conviction that military action in general, including humanitarian intervention, is justified.  
However, probably because of the perceived futility of trying to eliminate inevitable 
abuses, SDO does not convince of the effectiveness of such action.  Meanwhile, 
although authoritarians are not opposed to military action per se, they are less convinced 
of the justification of humanitarian intervention and actually regard it as counter-
productive.  We suggest that this is because such action can only increase the threat to 
the self and nation that is key to RWA.  That conjecture could be tested using a measure 
of isolationism which has been shown to correlate with authoritarianism (Cizmar et al. 
2014).  
 Another useful avenue for more research is the gender gap.  The finding that 
women are much more inclined to perceive humanitarian interventions as being both 
justifiable and effective seems to go against ample research finding men to be readier to 
support military intervention (Eichenberg 2003). Both a more refined analysis of gender 
gaps across conflict types and a more detailed analysis of the psychological mediators of 
these gender effects would be useful. 
 The future of R2P requires a dialogue between elites and publics about the 
justifiability and effectiveness of humanitarian intervention. The public, who have to bear 
the costs in terms of both blood and treasure, are clearly sceptical and especially about 
the effectiveness of these interventions. If the British government wants to generate 
political will among its public, it will need to do more than to emphasize the ethical case 
for action.  However, if the likeliest route to demonstrating effectiveness is through a 
successful intervention, and support from a reluctant public is a precondition for such 
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intervention, the British government may face a Catch 22 situation for some time to 
come. 
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